Discussion thread for the blog entry "The Argument for Atheism from Christianity" by theowarner.

Permalink: http://www.leagueofreason.co.uk/philosophy/the-argument-for-atheism-from-christianity/

Your logic works well enough. The problem is your definition of; "Christian". Many Christians claim they have reason for their belief in God.

I would have preferred you changed some of the wording a bit; such as instead of using "reason" using "evidence" instead.

For example, subjective/ personal experience can be considered "reason" and is not usually addressable by outside sources. While evidence actually is.

Great point you mentioned. Enough said.

TheTruePooka wrote:Your logic works well enough. The problem is your definition of; "Christian". Many Christians claim they have reason for their belief in God.

I would have preferred you changed some of the wording a bit; such as instead of using "reason" using "evidence" instead.

For example, subjective/ personal experience can be considered "reason" and is not usually addressable by outside sources. While evidence actually is.

I accept that if Christian means something other than I have defined it, the entire argument fails. However, I think it's worth pointing out that this compels us into the realm of theology almost instantly. Many arguments for and against the existence of God or arguments that surround atheism in general do not touch theology.... they attempt from natural theology (or philosophy, some would say) or from philosophy itself (Descartes, let's say) to do their work.

What is faith? As a Christian, what is faith? What does revelation say about faith?

These are questions that only the science of God could hope to answer. And as someone with a little bit of that stuff under my belt, while many Christians may disagree, many Christians do not.

I disagree with D1

D1. A proposition is either true or false.

It is often stated that all propositions have a truth value, however i have found this to be false in several circumstances.
The primary reasons why it fails comes down to statements by which can only be measured by a subjective standard, and not an absolute standard.

For example,

1 - Green is the best colour

2 - Murder is wrong


Both are statements, but both rely on opinion rather than an objective standard which can verfiy the truth value of the given statement.
Therefore you can never derive a truth value for an opinion, even though an opinion is a proposition/statement.

Digitised wrote:I disagree with D1

D1. A proposition is either true or false.

It is often stated that all propositions have a truth value, however i have found this to be false in several circumstances.
The primary reasons why it fails comes down to statements by which can only be measured by a subjective standard, and not an absolute standard.

For example,

1 - Green is the best colour

2 - Murder is wrong


Both are statements, but both rely on opinion rather than an objective standard which can verfiy the truth value of the given statement.
Therefore you can never derive a truth value for an opinion, even though an opinion is a proposition/statement.

Either it is the case that green is the best colour or it is not the case that green is t he best colour. I can't perceive of another alternative.

Likewise, it is the case that murder is wrong or it is not the case that murder is wrong.

This is tautology. It's very basic. But, to be fair, perhaps I should say:

It is either the case that a proposition is true or it is not the case that a proposition is true.

Thanks!

I know it doesnt have much relevance to the argument as a whole, but i still disagree that those statements have a truth value.
They both require an arbitrary and subjective standard in order to assess their value, since an absolute standard does not exist.

It think i have dealt with this issue in discussions about morality, where you need to beg the question in order to in any way able to evaluate the worth of an action or value. A question such as 'What is the best action to achieve a peaceful society?' is a pretty good example of this.
So you assume a goal (eg peace) which is built into the question but never justified, and then ask how to best evaluate an action (such as policing communities). The goal exists purely to provide a target or objective, in which case having armed police on the streets may contribute to peace and order.
However the value is limited to the context of the goal, which itself is defined intially by preference.

Since its root is based on personal preference, any consequent result obtained fails to meet any higher standard than a measure of efficiency.

Since there is no objective definition of 'best', you cannot find a 'best'.
It is a label, and its usage is not universally accepted and used.
People apply labels like good, bad, best, ugly, funny, enjoyable etc as a personal reaction, but there is no standard we can concieve which ever proves any action or preference to be absolute.

Therefore i reject that opinions and personal values have a truth value.

What about a paradox?

This sentence is false.

Digitised wrote:I know it doesnt have much relevance to the argument as a whole, but i still disagree that those statements have a truth value.
They both require an arbitrary and subjective standard in order to assess their value, since an absolute standard does not exist.

Therefore i reject that opinions and personal values have a truth value.

So... you would say they are not true.

Either it is the case that murder is wrong or it is not the case that murder is wrong. You would affirm the latter. I would agree.

theowarner wrote:

TheTruePooka wrote:Your logic works well enough. The problem is your definition of; "Christian". Many Christians claim they have reason for their belief in God.

I would have preferred you changed some of the wording a bit; such as instead of using "reason" using "evidence" instead.

For example, subjective/ personal experience can be considered "reason" and is not usually addressable by outside sources. While evidence actually is.

I accept that if Christian means something other than I have defined it, the entire argument fails. However, I think it's worth pointing out that this compels us into the realm of theology almost instantly. Many arguments for and against the existence of God or arguments that surround atheism in general do not touch theology.... they attempt from natural theology (or philosophy, some would say) or from philosophy itself (Descartes, let's say) to do their work.

What is faith? As a Christian, what is faith? What does revelation say about faith?

These are questions that only the science of God could hope to answer. And as someone with a little bit of that stuff under my belt, while many Christians may disagree, many Christians do not.

Well... to be more specific using the word "reason" suggests a chain of thought. And from what I've seen arguments that attempt to prove abstracts can be valid despite having no corporeal, physical realm evidence.

And if you are just using "reason" in the casual, every day usage of the word, then that is another problem. With common usage, the term "reason" can be applied to any chain of thought that reaches a conclusion, even if the reasoning is poor.

A similar problem comes up with the word "faith". When debating definition and meaning of the term; "faith" I find it helpful to be sure I'm not just focusing on; "faith in God", but "faith" in general.

I define faith as; "A belief that is held without evidence or in spite of evidence to the contrary."

My problem is I find it very difficult to argue such things without inevitably ending up in metaphysical arguments or philosophy of linguistics.

What would probably work (for me, at least) is if you placed, prior to the argument, two statements of definition; one for faith and one for reason. That way you can stop folks like me from coming in and trying to shift the argument into the theological realm of debate.

Digitised wrote:
I know it doesnt have much relevance to the argument as a whole, but i still disagree that those statements have a truth value.
They both require an arbitrary and subjective standard in order to assess their value, since an absolute standard does not exist.

Therefore i reject that opinions and personal values have a truth value.


So... you would say they are not true.

Either it is the case that murder is wrong or it is not the case that murder is wrong. You would affirm the latter. I would agree.

You missed the point.
He did not affirm anything. He is stating that without context, the statement is arbitrary and as such, can not be answered objectively. It is neither the case that murder is wrong, or the case that murder is not wrong, objectively speaking.

This logic is flawed in assigning an absolute reference to subjective logic.

Demojen wrote:

Digitised wrote:
I know it doesnt have much relevance to the argument as a whole, but i still disagree that those statements have a truth value.
They both require an arbitrary and subjective standard in order to assess their value, since an absolute standard does not exist.

Therefore i reject that opinions and personal values have a truth value.


So... you would say they are not true.

Either it is the case that murder is wrong or it is not the case that murder is wrong. You would affirm the latter. I would agree.

You missed the point.
He did not affirm anything. He is stating that without context, the statement is arbitrary and as such, can not be answered objectively. It is neither the case that murder is wrong, or the case that murder is not wrong, objectively speaking.

This logic is flawed in assigning an absolute reference to subjective logic.

Well, it is perhaps the case that I missed the point. How would I know otherwise?

But, anyway... you've also missed something here. I think he would affirm the latter. It's a tautological. The latter says almost nothing about murder. It makes almost no claims, merely that "murder is wrong" is not the case. In that sense, would you agree that murder is too complicated a thing (without context) to say it is wrong? So, it's the opposite. "Not the case that murder is wrong." What does that mean? It could mean anything. That's were we discuss it... we enter new variables and new contexts...

Yeah.

Anyway, tautologies are such there is no excluded middle. I may be wrong. Logic isn't my strong suit.

Aught3 wrote:What about a paradox?

This sentence is false.

Exactly what I thought about.

borrofburi wrote:

Aught3 wrote:What about a paradox?

This sentence is false.

Exactly what I thought about.

Paradoxes are not propositions.

theowarner wrote:Paradoxes are not propositions.

Oops my mistake, I'll pay more attention in future.

Well, it is perhaps the case that I missed the point. How would I know otherwise?

But, anyway... you've also missed something here. I think he would affirm the latter. It's a tautological. The latter says almost nothing about murder. It makes almost no claims, merely that "murder is wrong" is not the case. In that sense, would you agree that murder is too complicated a thing (without context) to say it is wrong? So, it's the opposite. "Not the case that murder is wrong." What does that mean? It could mean anything. That's were we discuss it... we enter new variables and new contexts...

Yeah.

Anyway, tautologies are such there is no excluded middle. I may be wrong. Logic isn't my strong suit.

I disagree that a proposition that has subjective context is tautological where you can claim that one statement means more or less than another. By your logic, in creating a list of alleged tautologies, you've attempted to demonstrate a flaw in logics, however it fails to address it's own particulars.

In a statement that "murder is wrong" is not the case, without context, "is too complicated", you're forming an additional opinion ontop of the initial argument. It forms a strawman argument in the end by mincing words.

If you meant to say something else, you should've said something else.

I've highlighted some words that begin to beg the question.

D1. A proposition is either true or false.
D2. To hold to a proposition is to hold that the 1) proposition is true and to hold that 2) holding the proposition does not cause the truth of the proposition.
D3. When X is a proposition, the reason for proposition X is a proposition which is true and but for it, X would be false.
D4. When X is a proposition, the faith in a proposition X is to hold a proposition without reason .
D5. A Christian is one who has faith that God exists.
D6. An atheist is one that holds that one does not have reason to hold that God exists.

To be honest Theo, i think statements D1, D2,D3 and D4 should just be left out completely.
They do not hold themsleves together or really strengthen the value of the last 2 claims.
This is a very good example of Occams razor, why use 6 statements when 2 is perfectly good enough?

D5 and D6 are fine as they stand, although you will find many christians and religious folk who claim to have 'evidentiary' positions which are above the level of faith. There is also the difference of faith and blind faith, as well as those who claim logical positions for the belief in God. In which case they would claim they have reason to believe.

I think with the honest theists it mainly comes down to how they interpret the evidence. Many appear to have a stumbling block with regards to thinking that the universe just could not be this way without a God, and see nature as incapable of creating any sort of ordered balance which could give rise to life.
I personally do not know your reasons behind your catholicism, but im sure one day you will enlighten us all

A number of criticisms can be levelled against this argument, but I will restrict myself to what I think are the most formally problematic. I've reconstructed the (somewhat convoluted) center of the argument as the following:

1 Either I hold that God exists or I don't.
2 If I hold that God exists, then I either have a reason to or not.
3 If I hold that God exists and I have a reason to, then I don't have faith that God exists.
4 If I hold that God exists but don't have a reason to, then I have faith that God exists.

This seems straightforward enough. The problems arise when we apply the technical definitions stated prior.

In d3, we get a "reason" defined as a true proposition that "but for it, X would be false." I interpret this to mean that, if p, our "reason," were false, then x would necessarily be false. Notice that p may yet be true without x being true. Notice also that the relation between x and p here does not match a normal conditional operator, in which it would be possible for p to be false and x to still be true. The relation is not biconditional for the same reason, and it is obviously neither a disjunction nor conjunction. So just what is the logical relation between p and x?

If in a statement, or proposition, both p & x are true, then the statement is true. It is also true if p is true and x is false, as the entailment is only stated to go one way in d3. But, if p were at any time false, the statement containing the false p and either a true or false x would be false itself. There is a name for this operation in Boolean logic: a proposition. The way that a "reason" is defined makes x and p logically interchangeable.

Let's rewrite our argument with our symbols and see if it's sensible in the light of the previous paragraph:

1 Either I hold x or I don't.
2 If I hold x, then I either hold p or not.
3 If I hold x and p, then I don't have faith that x.
4 If I hold x but not p, then I have faith that x.

So, faith is defined as holding x without holding p. But, this is logically impossible, as holding x is equivalent to holding p, as we've shown above. The sentence d5, "A Christian is one who has faith that God exists," is then false, as it's impossible to have faith at all using the way we've defined it. The sentences c1 and c2, then, are rendered absurd.

But these sentences aren't even the conclusion. My second criticism concerns the actual point of the argument, the last sentence "It is somehow absurd, therefore, for a Christian to argue that one ought not be an atheist." Let's grant that all the preceeding propositions are true and not internal contradictions (which, as we've seen, is granting a lot). This in no way entails our conclusion, that Christians ought not to argue that one shouldn't be an atheist. One could still argue on other grounds, such as believing God exists makes you a more moral person, or that it bestows meaning to one's life, or even that it's a familial courtesy you owe your parents. While these approaches are questionable, the point is that a Christian could argue for theism and Christianity on those grounds. This means that even if all our premisees were true, our conclusion may still be false. The argument is deductively invalid.

This is an interesting epistemological stab at a Kierkegaardian "leap of faith"—while this argument fails for having internal contradictions and being invalid, I do think it's getting at something important. I suggest reading up on some Kierkegaard, especially Either/Or, which makes a case similar to the gist of this argument.

Courtesy of Scott: AKA TheoreticalBullshit...
He always brings up the ideas that are on the tip of my tongue.

P1: Nothing which exists can cause something which does not exist to begin existing

P2:Given (1) Anything that begins to exist was not caused to do so by something which exists.

P3:The universe began to exist.

P4: Given (2) and (3) the universe was not caused to exist by anything which exists.

P5: God caused the universe to exist.

C:: Given (4) and (5) God does not exist.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aD9MtIma5YU